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Introduction
Three men residing in the United States have each been
convicted of identical crimes, which carry a prison sentence of three
years. The first man was born in Tennessee. He serves a three-year
sentence, and then, naturally, he is free to continue living in the United
States. The second man was born in Thailand. Several years prior to
committing his crime, he had applied for and gained admission to the
United States. He serves a three-year sentence, and then faces
* J.D., May 2005, Vanderbilt University Law School; Articles Editor,
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deportation. While awaiting the second man's deportation, the U.S.
government detains him. Unfortunately, neither Thailand nor any other
country will accept him. The U.S. Constitution prevents the government
from detaining the second man indefinitely.' Instead, if deportation is no
longer reasonably foreseeable, the government will likely release him
subject to certain conditions, much like parole after release from prison.2
The third man was born in Cuba. Several years prior to
committing his crime, he landed in a small boat on the Florida coast,
where the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted him. While his application for
admission to the United States was pending, rather than detaining him,
the U.S. "paroled" him into the country, where he could reside until the
conclusion of administrative proceedings to determine his admissibility.
After residing in the United States for several years, the third man
commits a crime and serves a three-year sentence, after which he faces
deportation. Like the second man, the third man is detained while
awaiting deportation. Unfortunately, neither Cuba nor any other country
will accept him. If the U.S. government chooses to detain him
indefinitely, possibly forever, most courts will find no constitutional
problem with his detention.
The third man's indefinite detention is made possible by the
"entry fiction." Under this doctrine, the third man is suspended in some
kind of constitutional wasteland, where he physically resides in the
United States but is treated as if he has never entered the country and is
waiting at the border. If one were to line up these three men, one next to
the other, one would certainly see three men. However, under the entry
fiction doctrine, the third man must be blurry, or perhaps appear as a
shadow, because while he is capable of eating, buying, working, and
committing crimes here, he is treated by the law as though he is not
really here. As a result, the protections of the U.S. Constitution do not
apply to him because he is treated as though he is not within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
As of January 2004, 2,269 immigrants awaiting deportation were
in prison, 920 of whom were Cubans who were paroled into the country
1 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 46 for a summary of these conditions. Note also that if the
second man had been bom in Mexico, for example, and had entered this country
undetected by crossing the border into Arizona from Mexico several years prior
to committing his crime, the result would likely be the same. See infra note 25
and accompanying text (noting the difference between an alien who has entered,
even illegally, and an alien who stands at the border awaiting entry).
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after the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Of these several thousand aliens, over half
have been in jail for more than six months. As the law currently stands,
most courts find that the indefinite detention of alien parolees is
constitutionally permissible. However, this term the U.S. Supreme Court
confronts this issue in Clark v. Martinez and Benitez v. Rozos.4
This article contends that unjustified institutional concerns are
what ultimately drive the circuit courts' analyses. When these
institutional concerns are removed, the rationale for refusing to apply the
Constitution to alien parolees disappears. Under this analysis, the
Constitution should apply to alien parolees, and the Supreme Court
should affirm the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Clark and reverse the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Benitez, thus ending our government's policy
of indefinite detention of alien parolees.
Part I of this article provides background information on the
constitutional rights of aliens, the roles of the different branches of
government in admitting aliens, and the indefinite detention of aliens.
Part II argues that the U.S. Constitution should apply to alien parolees
because they are legally indistinguishable from other aliens and because
the judiciary has no legitimate institutional concerns in applying the
Constitution to parolees. Part Ell discusses how the indefinite detention
of alien parolees violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.
3 Gina Holland, Supreme Court Says it will Resolve Future of Immigrant
Prisoners, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WL
56300888.
4 Martinez-Vasquez v. I.N.S., 346 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S.Ct. 1507 (Mar. 1, 2004) (NO. 03-878); Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th
Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1143 (Jan. 16, 2004) (NO. 03-7434). When
this article went to press, the Supreme Court had yet to issue decisions in these
two cases.
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I. Background
A. An Overview of the Basic Rights of Aliens
Generally, all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States enjoy the basic rights granted by the Constitution.5
However, aliens do not enjoy all of the same rights as citizens, and
Congress may permissibly treat them differently.6 For example, while a
lawful permanent resident is entitled to a fair hearing prior to
deportation, 7 certain constitutional protections applicable to a criminal
defendant are not accorded to an alien subject to a deportation
proceeding.' Additionally, while aliens enjoy "the right to education and
public welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in
licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citizens." 9 Indeed,
the admission of an alien, and presumably the constitutional rights
belonging to an alien as a new citizen or legal resident, are privileges
granted to that alien by the U.S. government.10
5For example, the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protect all
persons within the United States "from deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). In
addition, the Sixth Amendment provides that all such persons are entitled to a
fair criminal trial. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Amendment provides for the equal protection of the
laws "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction." Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213, 230 (1982)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from discriminating
against illegal aliens when providing education because "[t]he Equal Protection
Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based
and invidious class-based legislation"). Finally, the First Amendment
protections of the freedom of speech and freedom of the press are extended to
"aliens residing in this country." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
6 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78 n.12.
7 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 (1953); see also Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting "that a continuously present resident
alien is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation").
8 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 1050 (1984) (holding that
the exclusionary rule provided by Miranda and the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to deportation proceedings); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not require a reasonable bail amount
for a deportation proceeding).
9 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978).
10 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
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B. Executive and Legislative Power to Admit Aliens
The political branches of the Federal Government regulate the
relationship between aliens and the United States." When Congress
passes immigration laws, "[i]t is implementing an inherent executive
power," necessary for the executive "to control the foreign affairs of the
nation."' 12 It is not the position of a court "to review the determination of
the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien."' 3 After
all, the determination of how many and which immigrants to admit to our
country involves numerous value choices unsuitable for judicial
determination. 14
When dealing with immigration law, the Supreme Court has long
applied the Plenary Power Doctrine, under which the Court exercises
considerable deference when reviewing executive or legislative actions.'5
While not identical to the political question doctrine, the premise behind
the Plenary Power Doctrine is similar,' 6 as noted by the Court in Fiallo v.
Bell:
"[s]ince decisions in these matters may implicate our
relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety
of classifications must be defined in the light of
changing political and economic circumstances, such
decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate
to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the
Judiciary," and "[t]he reasons that preclude judicial
"1 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81.
" Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
13 Id. at 543; see also Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34-35 (noting that "[t]he role of the
judiciary is limited to determining whether the procedures meet the essential
standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not extend to
imposing procedures that merely displace congressional choices of policy");
Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) (noting that "[t]he
power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country,
and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through
executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled").
'4 GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 138 (Princeton
University Press 1996) (specifically noting choices related to "national identity,
population density, economic growth, and global distribution of resources").
15 Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright,
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32.
'
6NEUMAN, supra note 14, at 137.
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review of political questions also dictate a narrow
standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or
the President in the area of immigration and
naturalization."
1 7
Historically, the Court has permitted Congress to order the
deportation or expulsion of aliens whenever Congress considers such
action necessary for the public interest,1 8 even if it means excluding
aliens of a particular race19 or those who hold certain political beliefs.2 °
Indeed, the Court has noted that "no limits can be put by the courts upon
the power of Congress to protect, by summary methods, the country from
the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as
citizens . *...,21 Furthermore, the Court has provided that if aliens "fail
to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they remain subject
to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right
to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our
borders. 2 2
Of course, "neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our
own citizens. 23 As a result, "our immigration laws have long made a
distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking
7 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82).
18 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889). This case "has
come to stand for the idea of immigration control as an unenumerated, or even
extraconstitutional, power inherent in nationhood." NEUMAN, supra note 14, at
122.
19 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903) (Japanese).
20 United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289 (1904)
(anarchists).
21 Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237.
22 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534.
23 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). See
also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a nonresident alien located in a foreign
country); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (noting that "[i]f the
Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world .. . [it] would mean that
during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements [and] guerrilla
fighters . . .could require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to bear arms as in
the Second, security against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures as in the
Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments").
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admission ... and those who are within the United States after an entry,
irrespective of its legality. ' 24 In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, the Court noted that while
aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law .... an alien on the
threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing:
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned. 25
Until 1996, aliens in the former category were known by statute as
deportable aliens, subject to deportation proceedings, while aliens in the
latter category were known as excludable aliens, subject to exclusion
proceedings.26
24 Leng May Mav. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
25 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544).
26 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25; Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 391 n.1
(6th Cir. 2003). In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-546. Congress made several fundamental changes in immigration
terminology:
As amended, the Immigration Act refers to 'inadmissible'
aliens in the place of 'excludable' aliens. Although there are
still separate grounds of 'inadmissibility' and 'deportability,'
the distinction now turns on whether an alien has been
'admitted' to the United States, rather than on whether the
alien has gained 'entry.' Also, the former distinction between
'exclusion' and 'deportation' proceedings has been dropped in
favor of one procedure, called 'removal proceedings.' Chi
Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 395 n.4 (citations omitted).
Admission is defined as "the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. §
1101(13)(A). In other words, formerly excludable aliens as well as formerly
deportable aliens in the United States illegally are now classified as inadmissible
aliens. However, many courts still refer to "excludable" aliens, and doing so is
necessary to follow the common law. As a result, this article will later refer to
Fall 2005
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C. The Entry Fiction
An alien who applies for admission to the United States from his
home country is located outside of U.S. jurisdiction, so the Plenary
Power Doctrine demands that the Constitution not apply to his
application.27 However, many applicants apply for admission upon
arrival at a U.S. port, when they are physically within the territory of the
United States.28 To avoid forcing the Coast Guard to intercept an alien at
sea, the alien is deemed to retain his extraterritorial status by which he is
subject to the plenary power of the political branches to determine
whether or not he should be admitted.2 9 As stated by the Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Ju Toy, the alien, "although physically within our boundaries,
is to be regarded as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction
and kept there while his right to enter was under debate. 3 °
An alien who arrives in the United States is considered to be an
applicant for admission.3' If the "immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted," the alien is detained for a proceeding before an immigration
judge. 32 However, the alien may request parole while awaiting a ruling
on his admission.33 Indeed, an alien is seldom confined at the border
pending the resolution of administrative hearings to determine
admission.3 4 Rather, he is paroled into the country. 35 "Parole" in this
context differs from the conventional sense of the word, referring instead
to "permission by the Attorney General for ingress into the country
but... not a formal 'admission."' '36 This article and many commentators
refer to aliens paroled into the country as "parolees. 3 7
excludable aliens, even though the terminology is inconsistent with IIRIRA,
because courts continue to do so today.
27 U.S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905).
28 NEUMAN, supra note 14, at 124-25.
29 Id.
'0 198 U.S. at 263.
3' 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
32 Id. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1229a(a)(1).
33 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 855 (1985).34 Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 190.
35 Id.
36 Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 392 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (summarizing 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(13)(B) provides that "an alien who is
paroled under section 11 82(d)(5) of this title or permitted to land temporarily as
an alien crewman shall not be considered to have been admitted."
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Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to "in
his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such
conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission to the United States ... The Attorney General, in turn,
delegated this power to the Department of Homeland Security
(hereinafter "DHS") Secretary as well as other DHS agents. 39 While
legislative history suggests that "parole was meant to be the exception
rather than the rule,, 40 the discretion of the Attorney General and DHS
officials in granting parole is significant, and it "frequently has been used
37 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and
Impact ofZadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 375 (2002) (referring to
these aliens as "parolees"). To clarify, there are two categories of excludable
aliens: (1) those detained upon arrival and who continue to be detained; and (2)
alien parolees. However, many courts will also refer to alien parolees generally
as "excludable aliens."
38 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
'9 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a). On March 1, 2003, the responsibility for providing
immigration-related services shifted from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a
bureau of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Responsibility for
investigation and enforcement of immigration laws shifted from the INS to the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), also a bureau of DHS,
and the Border and Transportation Security (BTS), a division of DHS.
Immigration and Borders, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme home4.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
40 Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1987). Indeed the Senate
committee stated that
it is the express intent of the committee that the parole
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
remain unchanged by this bill, be administered in accordance
with the original intention of the drafters of that legislation.
The parole provisions were designed to authorize the Attorney
General to act only in emergent, individual, and isolated
situations, such as the case of an alien who requires immediate
medical attention, and not for the immigration of classes or
groups outside of the limit of the law.
S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328,
3335.
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as well in lieu of detention when a determination of an arriving alien's
admissibility has been delayed. 41
To deal with the legal status of such aliens, the U.S. Supreme
Court applied the entry fiction: although an alien parolee is physically
within the jurisdiction of the United States, that alien would be treated as
if he was "stopped at the boundary line and kept there unless [his] right
to enter should be declared. 42 In Kaplan v. Tod, the Court addressed a
situation where a Russian girl refused admission to the country was
prevented from leaving due to the outbreak of World War I:
When her prison bounds were enlarged by committing
her to the custody of the Hebrew Society, the nature of
her stay within the territory was not changed. She was
still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained
no foothold in the United States .... Theoretically she is
in custody at the limit of the jurisdiction awaiting the
order of the authorities.
43
In Leng May Ma v. Barber, the Court further explained the
rationale behind the entry fiction:
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a
device through which needless confinement is avoided
while administrative proceedings are conducted. It was
never intended to affect an alien's status, and to hold that
petitioner's parole placed her legally "within the United
States" is inconsistent with the congressional mandate,
the administrative concept of parole, and the decisions of
this Court. Physical detention of aliens is now the
exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only
as to security risks or those likely to abscond. Certainly
41 U.S. v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 733 n.1 (1st Cir. 1980). For example,
many of the 120,000 Mariel Cubans who came to the United States in 1980 were
paroled into the country. See note 61 and accompanying text.
42 Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); see also United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (also applying entry fiction); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1892) (same).
41 Kaplan, 267 U.S. at 229-31.
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this policy reflects the humane qualities of an
enlightened civilization."
As seen above, proponents of the entry fiction claim that it (1) provides
needed flexibility to the government; and (2) is a humane policy because
parole is better than detention, the likely alternative.
D. Indefinite Detention of Aliens
1. The Alien Detention Statute
8 U.S.C. § 1231 provides guidelines for the detention, release,
and removal of aliens ordered removed. The statute directs the Attorney
General to remove these aliens within ninety days.45 In addition, §
1231 (a)(6) provides that the Attorney General may detain certain aliens
beyond the ninety-day removal period:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 1182 of this title, removable under section
1227(a)(1)(C) [violation of status or condition of entry
requirements], 1227(a)(2) [commission of crimes], or
1227(a)(4) [national security concerns] of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be
a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of
supervision in paragraph (3).46
44 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
" Id. § 123 1(a)(1)(A).
46 Id. § 1231 (a)(6). The § 1231 (a)(3) terms of supervision referred to above
provide as follows:
If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the
removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to
supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General. The regulations shall include provisions requiring
the alien-
(A) to appear before an immigration officer periodically for
identification;
(B) to submit, if necessary, to a medical and psychiatric
examination at the expense of the United States Government;
(C) to give information under oath about the alien's
nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities,
Fall 2005
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Justice Breyer summarized the regulatory scheme of the review
process for these detained aliens in his majority opinion in Zadvydas v.
Davis:
[T]he [DHS] District Director will initially review the
alien's records to decide whether further detention or
release is warranted after the 90-day removal period
expires. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(c)(1), (h), (k)(l)(i) (2001). If
the decision is to detain, then [a] [DHS] panel will
review the matter further, at the expiration of a 3-month
period or soon thereafter. § 241.4(k)(2)(ii). And the
panel will decide, on the basis of records and a possible
personal interview, between still further detention or
release under supervision. § 241.4(i). In making this
decision, the panel will consider, for example, the alien's
disciplinary record, criminal record, mental health
reports, evidence of rehabilitation, history of flight, prior
immigration history, and favorable factors such as
family ties. § 241.4(f). To authorize release, the panel
must find that the alien is not likely to be violent, to pose
a threat to the community, to flee if released, or to
violate the conditions of release. § 241.4(e). And the
alien must demonstrate 'to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General' that he will pose no danger or risk of
flight. § 241.4(d)(1). If the panel decides against
release, it must review the matter again within a year,
and can review it earlier if conditions change. §§
241.4(k)(2)(iii), (v). 4
7
2. Zadvydas v. Davis: Indefinite Detention of
Legal Aliens
Because the statute and regulatory scheme described above
impose no firm limits upon the duration of detention, the question arises
and other information the Attorney General considers
appropriate; and
(D) to obey reasonable written restrictions on the alien's
conduct or activities that the Attorney General prescribes for
the alien.
533 U.S. 678, 683-84 (2001).
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whether aliens ordered removed may be detained indefinitely under §
1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court addressed this very
question regarding legally admitted aliens.48 Two such aliens who faced
deportation for committing crimes had been detained for some time
because no country would accept them.49 The Court held that because an
interpretation that the statute permits indefinite detention "would raise
serious constitutional concerns, [it would] construe the statute to contain
an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is
subject to federal-court review."5 In other words, it is reasonable to
detain an alien only so long as removal is reasonably foreseeable; once it
is not, the alien's detention must end.5  The Court noted that a
reasonable time period is presumed to be six months:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing. And for detention to remain
reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval
confinement grows, what counts as the 'reasonable
foreseeable future' conversely would have to shrink.
This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that
every alien not removed must be released after six
months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in
confinement until it has been determined that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.52
The Court explained the rationale behind its decision, observing
that "freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention,
48 533 U.S. at 682.
49 Id. at 684-86.
5 0 Id. at 682.
51 Id. at 699-700. Once detention ends, the alien is not simply released into
society without restriction. Rather, he is released subject to certain conditions
with which he must comply. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; infra
note 117 and accompanying text.
52 Id. at 701. The Court did not come up with the six-month period out of thin
air. It "[had] reason to believe . . . that Congress previously doubted the
constitutionality of detention for more than six months." Id.
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or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that
[the Due Process Clause] protects. 53  Indeed, detention is only
appropriate when ordered in a criminal trial, with certain procedural
protections, or in the nonpunitive setting, when some special justification
outweighs the individual's interest in freedom from imprisonment. 4 The
Court further noted that "[t]he serious constitutional problem arising out
of a statute that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps
permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any such protection is
obvious." 55
In limiting its holding to legally admitted aliens, the Court
distinguished Mezei, a case upholding the indefinite detention of an
excludable alien.56 In that case the alien, in custody on Ellis Island, had
yet to effect an entry into the United States, "[a]nd that made all the
difference., 57 The Court noted that while constitutional protections are
not available outside the borders of the United States, "[o]nce an alien
enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.,, 58 However,
the only issue the Court ultimately addressed was the application of §
1231 (a)(6) to legally admitted aliens.59
" Id. at 690.
54 Id.
51 Id. at 692.
56 Id. at 693 (discussing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 213-215 (1953)).
57 id.
58 id.
59 Id. at 682. The Court noted that it was dealing "here with aliens who were
admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed. Aliens who
have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very
different question." Unfortunately, such a statement does not exactly clarify the
issue, because the Court referred to "admission," the term used since imposition
of the IRIRA, rather than "excludable" or "deportable," terms used prior to the
IRIRA. The problem is that later in the opinion, when distinguishing Mezei, the
Court emphasizes the fact that the alien was excludable, and observes that the
Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States (i.e., all aliens
but excludable aliens). Id. at 693. Thus, the terminology used by the Court is
inconsistent.
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3. Indefinite Detention of Alien Parolees
Whether § 1231(a)(6) permits the indefinite detention of alien
parolees is the subject of a split among the circuit courts of appeal. Two
circuit courts of appeal have held that the statute does not allow the
government to detain alien parolees indefinitely. In Rosales-Garcia v.
Holland, the Sixth Circuit extended the Zadvydas ruling to alien
parolees. 60 Both petitioners had come to the United States from Cuba in
the 1980 Mariel boatlift and were then paroled into the country,6' and
both had since committed serious crimes and were ordered excluded.62
However, Cuba refused to accept their deportation, so the INS continued
to detain them.63 One of the petitioner aliens had been in INS custody
for almost fifteen years, almost nine of which were subsequent to his
exclusion, and all of which were subsequent to the completion of his
sentence. 64
The court based its conclusion on two separate grounds. First, it
noted that it would be difficult for the Supreme Court to interpret §
123 1(a)(6) as having a reasonableness requirement for aliens removable
on deportability grounds but not aliens removable on inadmissibility
grounds. 65 After all, the statute did not "draw any distinction between
the categories of removable aliens; nor would there be any statutory
reason to interpret 'detained beyond the removal period' differently" for
these two categories of aliens.66 The court also observed that the Court
opinion in Zadvydas repeatedly referred to aliens generally, not
distinguishing between different categories of aliens.67 In addition, the
court noted that the discussion in Zadvydas regarding Mezei and other
cases merely established that excludable aliens were entitled to less
process, but not that they were not protected at all by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:
If excludable aliens were not protected by even the
substantive component of constitutional due process, as
60 322 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003).
61 Many of these 120,000 Mariel Cubans were paroled into the United States.
Id. at 390-391.
62 Id. at 391.
63 Id. at 391-92.
64 Id. at 393 n.5.
65 Id. at 404.
6 6 Id. at 404-405.
67 Id. at 406, 408.
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the government appears to argue, we do not see why the
United States government could not torture or
summarily execute them. Because we do not believe
that our Constitution could permit persons living in the
United States-whether they can be admitted for
permanent residence or not-to be subjected to any
government action without limit, we conclude that
government treatment of excludable aliens must
implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.68
As a second basis for its holding, the court held that even if
Zadvydas did not support its conclusion, the indefinite detention of
inadmissible aliens independently "raises the same constitutional
concerns ... as the indefinite detention of aliens who have entered the
United States. 69  The court noted that subsequent Supreme Court
decisions had undermined Mezei, and that Mezei was based in large part
on the fact that the alien was a threat to national security.70 Finally, the
court observed that the aliens' status as excludable aliens did not affect
either of the main rationales for detention, risk of flight or danger to
society:
An excludable alien who cannot be removed to his
country of origin presents no greater risk of flight than
the aliens who could not be removed to their countries of
origin in Zadvydas; nor does an excludable alien's status
relate any more to his dangerousness than the removable
status of the aliens in Zadvydas related to their
dangerousness.71
The Ninth Circuit has also held in Xi v. INS that Zadvydas
extends to excludable aliens, but it did not reach the constitutional issues
68 Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 413-14. In Mezei, the Court noted that the alien "simply left the United
States and remained behind the Iron Curtain for 19 months." 345 U.S. at 214.
"An exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the national security ...
presents different considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority
for such release exists." Id. at 216.
71 Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 411.
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considered by the Sixth Circuit in Rosales-Garcia; rather, it based its
holding solely on statutory interpretation, the first basis for the Rosales-
Garcia decision.12 The court inXi noted that "[i]n enacting § 123 l(a)(6),
Congress chose to treat all of the categories of aliens the same. 7 3
Therefore, the court refused to amend the statute, which "falls within the
legislative, not the judicial, prerogative., 74
Martinez- Vazquez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit case before the
Supreme Court, fits the typical fact pattern for these cases. 75 Gilberto
Martinez-Vasquez was paroled into the U.S. from Cuba in 1980, after
which he committed numerous felonies and served time in prison. He
entered INS custody in October 2001 to await his removal to Cuba, but
predictably Cuba refused to accept him. 76 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
District Court's decision to grant Martinez's petition for habeas corpus,
following Xi and holding that Zadvydas extends to alien parolees.77
However, with the exception of the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit, all five of the other circuits confronting the issue have upheld the
indefinite detention of excludable aliens as constitutionally and
statutorily permissible.78 Much of the reasoning underlying these
decisions is the same. In Borrero v. Aijets, the Eighth Circuit held that
"Zadvydas's narrowing construction of § 1231(a)(6) does not limit the
government's statutory authority to detain inadmissible aliens., 7 9 The
court noted that "[t]he constitutional issue avoided in Zadvydas is simply
72 Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002). Note that Xi dealt with an
excludable alien who was not an alien parolee. Id. at 834. See note 37 for an
explanation of the difference between alien parolees and other excludable aliens
who have not been paroled into the country. This article later argues that
Zadvydas should not apply to excludable aliens not paroled into the country,
which would dictate a result contrary to the holding of Xi.
73 Id.
74 id.
7' 346 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003). The name of the case before the Supreme Court
is now Clark v. Martinez.
76 Id. at 904-905.
77 Id.
78 Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d 559 (3d Cir. 2003); Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d
1289 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003); Rios v.
INS, 324 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2003); Hoyte-Mesa v. Ashcroft, 272 F.3d 989 (7th
Cir. 2001).
7' 325 F.3d at 1005.
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not present in the context of aliens who have not effected an entry into
the United States." 80
Similarly, in Benitez v. Wallis, the other case now before the
Supreme Court,8' the Eleventh Circuit held that based on Mezei,
excludable aliens have no constitutional right precluding indefinite
detention.82 In addition, the Court held that under the Zadvydas
interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) such aliens have no statutory right
precluding indefinite detention: "Because Zadvydas was qualified in so
many respects and reads like an as-applied decision, we conclude that the
Supreme Court left the law, and it seems to us the statutory scheme too,
intact with respect to inadmissible aliens who never have been admitted
into the United States. 83 Finally, the Court noted that "[c]reating a right
to parole for unadmitted aliens after six months would create an
unprotected spot in this country's defense of its borders. 84
With the circuit courts upholding indefinite detention
outnumbering those striking it down by a count of five to two, the current
state of the law is that the indefinite detention of alien parolees is
generally upheld as constitutionally permissible. However, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in January 2004 to hear Benitez v. Rozos and in
March to hear Clark v. Martinez.85 The Court heard oral arguments for
the two cases jointly on October 13, 2004.86
II. Application of the Constitution to Parolees
A statute permitting the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens
would be blatantly unconstitutional.87 Meanwhile, a statute permitting
the indefinite detention of aliens intercepted at sea or at the port of entry
80 Id. at 1007.
81 The name of the case before the Supreme Court is now Benitez v. Rozos.
82 337 F.3d 1289, 1298 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1143 (Jan. 16,
2004) (NO. 03-7434).
83 Id. at 1299.
84 Id. at 1300.
" See supra note 4.
86 Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2004 Monthly Argument
Calendar, October, available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/02aug20041430/www.supremecourtus.
gov/oralarguments/argument-calendars/monthlyargurnentcaloctober2004.pdf
(last visited August 20, 2004).
87 See infra note 123 and accompanying text for a discussion of when the
government has appropriately detained persons due to the use of adequate
safeguards.
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would be permissible, because these aliens have no enforceable
constitutional rights. The issue confronted in this article and in Benitez
and Crawford is the constitutionality of a statute that permits the
indefinite detention of alien parolees, many of whom have lived and
worked here side by side with U.S. citizens and legally admitted aliens.
The Plenary Power Doctrine has long influenced the courts'
treatment of aliens, 88 and it has undoubtedly impacted the circuit courts
of appeal which have upheld the indefinite detention of parolees.
However, an analysis of the issue presented in this article would not be
complete without taking a step back and asking whether such deference
to the political branches is appropriate under these circumstances.
Courts exercise deference in immigration matters because of institutional
concerns-i.e., the judiciary's preoccupation with overstepping its role in
our system of government. One must examine whether these
institutional concerns are justified in the political branches' treatment of
alien parolees.
Therefore, in selecting a mode of analysis, it is appropriate to
apply a theory that incorporates adequate consideration of the judiciary's
institutional concerns. Professor Lawrence Sager presents such a theory,
arguing that when the judiciary makes a substantive decision based upon
institutional concerns, the political branches interpret the judiciary's
institutional decision as a clear definition of a constitutional norm.89
When these institutional concerns cause the definition presented in the
judiciary's decision to fall short of the conceptual limits of the
constitutional norm, the political branches underenforce the norm.9O
Therefore, Professor Sager argues that "judicially underenforced
constitutional norms should be regarded as legally valid to their
conceptual limits."9'
Applying Professor Sager's theory in the context of the issue
presented in this article clarifies and helps drive the analysis of the
judiciary's proper role in applying the Constitution to alien parolees. If
the government may not indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen, then it follows
that extending constitutional norms to their conceptual limits would
result in a finding that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
88 See supra Part I.B..
89 Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1226 (1978). See infra note 101
and accompanying text for further explanation of Professor Sager's theory.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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States are protected from indefinite detention.92 This is not the law,
which means that, as an analytical matter, there are two possibilities: (1)
different substantive constitutional norms apply to alien parolees; or (2)
institutional concerns constrain the courts from more fully enforcing
constitutional norms-i.e., § 1231(a)(6) is subject to the Plenary Power
Doctrine.93 This article concludes that the latter is what underlies courts'
approach to alien parolees, and that these institutional concerns are in
reality unjustified.
A. Different Substantive Constitutional Norms?
The first possibility is that lower substantive constitutional
norms apply to parolees than to U.S. citizens. In other words,
institutional concerns are irrelevant, and the Constitution has a double
standard for substantive norms.94 Georgetown Law Center Dean T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, widely published in the area of immigration law, 95
argues that while there are many statements from Supreme Court
opinions that would support such a reading, in this argument ultimately
there are "weaknesses [that] suggest that something else is the engine
96that drives the plenary power train," namely institutional concerns.
The question then becomes whether there should be lower
substantive constitutional norms for alien parolees. More specifically,
should the norms be so low that our government should be able to detain
these aliens indefinitely? The parolee resides in the United States,
enjoying many of the benefits of life here that others enjoy, at times for a
period of years. What relevant differences are there between this alien
and his neighbors that would justify applying lower substantive
constitutional norms? The longer he is here, the more he assimilates into
his community:
As an alien resides in the United States for a longer
period of time, it is foreseeable and highly probable that
she will develop a network of personal associations,
92 See id.
93 See id. at 1224; T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 155 (2002).
94 ALE1NIKOFF, supra note 93, at 156.
95 Georgetown University Law Center web site, available at
http://www.law.igeorgetown.edu/curriculum/tab faculty.cfn?Status=Faculty&D
etail=208 (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
96 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 93, at 156-57.
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integrating into some segment of American society and
adapting to its way of life .... To lead more fulfilling
lives, immigrants develop knowledge, skills, and
relationships-they "invest in human capital"-that
would be wasted if they had to return in their country of
origin. They may adopt ideals or life goals that could
not be realized in their native countries. Some of these
attachments implicate particular constitutional rights that
serve as side constraints on deportation, but many do
not, and their cumulative effect is greater than the sum of
the parts.97
By paroling the alien into the country, the government gives him
a taste of American life without the full protection of the U.S.
Constitution. While the legal fiction that an excludable alien detained at
the border is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is a
practical necessity,98 the entry fiction as applied to a parolee creates a
separate constitutional class of persons residing in the United States
when there is no compelling reason to do so. Again, the DHS policy that
many courts sanction involves drastically different constitutional
treatment for alien parolees, despite the fact that these aliens are
permitted by DHS to live and work among citizens. These people do not
appear to be so different that they should not enjoy similar basic
constitutional protections. DHS has decided to parole these aliens into
the country. Therefore, courts should hold DHS accountable for this
decision, forcing it to live with the consequences of constitutional
protection for these parolees, rather than bailing out DHS by applying the
entry fiction.
Moreover, while different treatment might be appropriate in
some contexts, such as voting rights, the thought that different
substantive constitutional norms might exist for such fundamental
protections as the prohibition of deprivation of liberty without due
process of law is disturbing indeed. Again, alien parolees, like other
noncitizen aliens, have not pledged their primary allegiance to the U.S.,
and therefore are unable to vote or have a Social Security number.
However, their mere physical presence within the U.S., not to mention
the U.S. government's approval of it, should be sufficient to allow them
to enjoy the most fundamental of constitutional protections.
97 NEUMAN, supra note 14, at 132.
98 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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B. Institutional Concerns
The second possibility is that the judiciary believes that
constitutional norms apply equally to parolees but that it is inappropriate
for the Court in its institutional role to enforce these norms as to these
particular aliens.99 If this is the case, then the duty falls upon Congress
and DHS officials to obey the constitutional norms despite the fact that
they are underenforced by the judiciary.'00 However, as Professor Sager
explains:
When institutional concerns result in the invocation of
the political question doctrine, we understand the
constitutional norm at issue to retain its legal validity.
But when institutional concerns lead instead to limited
federal enforcement of the constitutional norm in
question, we treat the absence of judicial intervention as
an authoritative statement about the norm itself. There is
thus an inconsistency in the current understanding of
federal judicial decisions which withhold full
enforcement of constitutional norms in the service of
institutional concerns. TM
If § 123 l(a)(6) is any indication, Congress has failed to fulfill its
obligation to fully obey the underenforced constitutional norms. On its
face, the statute permits the detention of removable aliens "beyond the
removal period" without providing any limits on exactly how long the
government may detain these aliens. 0 2 The Supreme Court thought it
necessary to imply a reasonable time limitation in Zadvydas in order to
avoid "rais[ing] serious constitutional concerns."' 103
Of course, the Zadvydas case lacked plenary power concerns
because the federal government had already admitted the two aliens.'0 4
Therefore, by imposing limitations upon their detention, the Court could
not possibly interfere with the power of the political branches to
determine whom they allow to enter the United States. In the future,
99 Sager, supra note 89, at 1224-25; ALEINIKOFF, supra note 93, at 155.100 Sager, supra note 89, at 1227.
1o' Id. at 1226.
102 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2000).
103 Zadydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
104 Id. at 684-85.
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when Congress enacts legislation and DHS makes policies related to the
indefinite detention of legal aliens, they will do so with Zadvydas in
mind-the Supreme Court has made clear the constitutional norm, so the
other two branches are forced to comply.
However, because most circuit courts of appeal have refused to
extend Zadvydas to parolees,' °5 Congress and DHS are not forced to
obey certain constitutional norms in their dealings with alien parolees.
So the duty falls upon those branches to obey the constitutional norms
without enforcement by the judiciary. 10 6 However, since Zadvydas was
issued, Congress has not revised § 123 1(a)(6), and the government
continues to argue that Zadvydas should not be extended to alien
parolees.'0 7 The political branches have thus once again failed to fulfill
their obligation to fully obey constitutional norms beyond the
interpretation by the judicial branch. It is doubtful that they will fulfill
this obligation anytime in the near future. After all, aliens have no
voting power, so the political branches will not be inclined to address
aliens' concerns. The obvious solution is for the Court itself to extend
Zadvydas to alien parolees, thus putting the issue of treatment of parolees
back on the table for Congress and DHS to consider.
This proposal and the refusal of many courts to accept it raises
another question: is the indefinite detention of parolees really an issue
that should raise institutional concerns for the Court? When DHS
paroles an excludable alien into the country, it is taking an affirmative
action to allow the alien to enter our country (in the physical, if not the
legal, sense) and reside here while his case is pending. DHS could just
as easily detain the alien at the border until his status is resolved. One
may assume that if DHS finds the alien to be undesirable as a citizen,
10 8
it would detain him at the border. However, by paroling the alien into
the country, DHS is making a determination that it is safe to allow the
alien to reside in our country, at least temporarily, while his application
is pending.
An excludable alien held at the border is a different story.1' 9 In
this case, if the government is held to the reasonable time limitation set
105 See supra note 78.
106 See supra note 100.
107 See generally supra notes 71, 72, and 78.
108 See supra note 21.
109Again, see note 37 for an explanation of the difference between an alien
parolee and an excludable alien who is not paroled into the country. Also note
that where exactly the alien is detained is unimportant. See Kaplan, supra note
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forth in Zadvydas, a court could order DHS to release the excludable
alien into the United States, subject to certain conditions." ° The end
result of such a rule would be that the judiciary is effectively determining
who may enter the country, which would violate over a century of
precedent regarding the Plenary Power Doctrine."' For this reason,
Zadvydas should not apply to excludable aliens held at the border. It
would take the power to determine the physical admission of an alien
away from the political branches and transfer that power to the judicial
branch, a duty which the judiciary is ill-suited to perform. 112 However,
this distinction should not be interpreted as suggesting that no protections
should be available to excludable aliens held at the border. This proposal
simply means that the judiciary should not enforce constitutional norms
to the fullest extent-keeping in mind, however, that the political
branches still carry an affirmative duty to obey these constitutional
norms when dealing with excludable aliens held at the border.'
On the other hand, by paroling an alien into the country, the
political branches are exercising their plenary power by determining
which aliens may enter this country, even if only temporarily.
Consequently, the judiciary is not interfering with Congress's plenary
power if it imposes a reasonable time limitation upon the indefinite
detention of parolees. Unlike when addressing the detention of
excludable aliens held at the border, the judiciary would not be
effectively determining who may enter the country; rather, it would
42, at 230-231. The distinction is drawn upon the alien's status-i.e., has the
alien been in custody since arrival, or has the alien been paroled into the
country? If the alien has been in custody since arrival and has been transferred
to a facility in Wyoming, for example, the fact that the alien is detained in
Wyoming is unimportant. Because his status has not changed, he is and should
be treated as if he is being held at the border. Note how drastically different this
situation is from one in which an alien is paroled in and allowed the freedom to
live and work in this country without being detained.
" Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96 (noting that "[t]he choice ... is not between
imprisonment and the alien 'living at large.' It is between imprisonment and
supervision under release conditions that may not be violated." (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ § 1231 (a)(3) (granting authority to Attorney General to prescribe regulations
governing supervision of aliens not removed within 90 days); § 1253 (imposing
penalties for failure to comply with release conditions) (1994 ed., Supp. V); 8
C.F.R. § 241.5 (2001) (establishing conditions of release after removal period)).
"1 See supra Part I.B.
"12 See NEUMAN, supra note 14.
113 Sager, supra note 89, at 1227.
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simply be relying upon DHS's decision to parole the alien into the
country. Therefore, there are no institutional limitations on the judiciary
that prevent it from applying the Constitution to alien parolees. The
judiciary may proceed to enforce constitutional norms regarding
parolees, and Congress and DHS will be forced to comply with these
clearly-established norms.
C. Practical, Moral, and Policy Concerns
Several concerns exist regarding this proposal which, upon close
examination, prove to be unproblematic. First, there is the practical
concern that if courts grant parolees constitutional rights equal to other
aliens, DHS will simply stop paroling aliens into the country, choosing
instead to detain them at the border. 14 Although the government will
likely respond in this manner, one must ask whether that would
ultimately be an imprudent change in policy.
To the contrary, ending our system of parole would introduce
order and efficiency to U.S. immigration policy. The current system
allows DHS to delay adjudication of applications for admission for years,
because parolees and their home governments are unlikely to complain
that the aliens are being allowed to reside in the United States. By
refusing to recognize the constitutional rights of parolees, the courts have
only encouraged the authorities to continue to allow aliens to enter the
country, only to be treated with second-class constitutional status.
Notably, however, extending constitutional protections to
parolees would eliminate this second-class status that is inconsistent with
the ideals of the premier democracy in the world. When Congress or
DHS responds by abolishing the parole policy, they may initially detain
some applicants for a length of time at the border. However, political
and diplomatic pressures, as well as the cost of detention, would demand
that our immigration system become more efficient in its adjudication of
applications, thus shortening the length of detention at the border.
Assuming that DHS is adequately funded, there is no reason that
applications for admission cannot be processed more quickly. DHS will
scrutinize these applications in order to prevent the entry of terrorists and
will act consistently with country- and industry-specific entry quotas
determined by Congress. Some applicants will be permitted to enter, and
the many others who are not will be successfully deported back to their
home countries. As seen earlier, in some cases there will be no
114 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 37, at 376.
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government that will accept the deportee. In such cases, the courts
should require that DHS fully obey the relevant constitutional norms.'15
It is true that the current DHS policy of parole, and the courts'
tolerance of it, provide significant flexibility to DHS. But this policy has
done even greater harm both to the parolees and to this country, whose
citizens may well believe that their country has moved past the time
when its inhabitants were allowed two levels of constitutional protection.
A court ruling extending constitutional protections to parolees would
both protect parolees currently residing in the United States and force the
government to improve the efficiency of our immigration system.
An additional moral concern exists because most of the aliens in
these cases are criminals. One might wonder why we should grant
constitutional protections to people whose behavior is so morally
objectionable. However, as Justice Frankfurter noted, "[i]t is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently
been forged in controversies involving not very nice people."'"1 6 While
many of these aliens do not inspire much sympathy due to the crimes that
they have committed, courts must keep in mind, especially in our
common law system, that judicial decisions affect not only the case at
hand but also many other cases that follow. Even if a court decision
benefits a "not very nice" person, that fact is more than outweighed by
the benefits the decision could bring to many other alien parolees. After
all, § 123 1(a)(6) applies to other classes of deportees as well, not just
criminals. Finally, as the Court noted in Zadvydas, "[t]he choice ... is
not between imprisonment and the alien 'living at large.' It is between
imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be
violated."' "
A final policy concern is whether, in light of the September 11,
2001 attacks, we should really be more generous to outsiders. The
Eleventh Circuit in Benitez expressed this very concern when it noted
that disallowing indefinite detention of alien parolees would "create an
unprotected spot in this country's defense of its borders." ' 18 However, as
noted earlier, the government has already decided to parole these aliens
into the country. Again, one may assume that if DHS deems an alien
unfit for entry, it would not parole him into the country. In addition,
115 See note 113 and accompanying text.
116 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
" 533 U.S. at 696 (citations omitted).
"8 337 F.3d at 1300.
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there is nothing stopping the courts from carving out an exception to the
proposed rule for terrorists. In fact, the Court in Zadvydas explicitly
considered this possibility, noting that it was not "consider[ing] terrorism
or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made
for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches with respect to national security."'1 9
By limiting the new rule to parolees and not extending it to those
detained at the border, courts would create no such "unprotected spot" in
our borders.
Institutional concerns appear to be at the heart of why most
courts refuse to apply the Constitution to alien parolees. However,
applying the above analysis, one can see that these institutional concerns
are unjustified, which removes the circuit courts' rationale for refusing to
apply the Constitution to parolees. Therefore, the Constitution should
apply to parolees just as it does to legal residents and other aliens granted
basic constitutional protections.
III. Constitutional Problems with Indefinite Detention
Having established that the Constitution should apply to alien
parolees, it follows necessarily that the Zadvydas analysis should extend
to alien parolees. This indefinite, potentially permanent detention
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a matter of
both substantive and procedural due process. The Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." "Substantive
due process" prohibits our government from taking action that "shocks
the conscience."' 2 °  If a government action passes substantive due
process scrutiny, it still must be implemented in a fair manner, known as
procedural due process.1
2
'
A. Substantive Due Process
Section 1231(a)(6) does not pass substantive due process
scrutiny. The freedom to move about without restraint is the most
"9 533 U.S. at 696.
120 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
121 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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fundamental liberty interest a person can possess, 122 so a court shouldreview § 1231 (a)(6) with some level of heightened scrutiny. As noted by
the Court in Zadvydas,
Freedom from imprisonment-from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects. See
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). And this
Court has said that government detention violates that
Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural protections, see
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987), or in
certain special and narrow' nonpunitive
'circumstances,' Foucha, supra, at 80, where a special
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the 'individual's constitutionally protected
interest in avoiding physical restraint.' Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997).123
In Zadvydas, the Court noted that "the proceedings at issue here
are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they are nonpunitive inpurpose and effect." '124  However, at a certain point, when the
government restrains a person's liberty for such a significant period of
time, the effect of this detention must be punitive, even if it is labeled as
nonpunitive civil detention.
Even Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in United States
v. Salerno recognized this possibility. 125 In Salerno, the Court upheld
provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 that allowed pretrial detention
based on concerns of future dangerousness. 126 The Court first stated that
the mere fact that a person is detained does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government
122 Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[l]iberty from bodily
restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action").
123 533 U.S. at 690 (emphasis in original).
124 id.
125 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
126 Id. at 746.
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has imposed punishment .... Unless Congress expressly
intended to impose punitive restrictions, the
punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 'whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned [to it]. 12
7
However, the Court went on to note that it "intimate[d] no view as to the
point at which detention in a particular case might become excessively
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory
goal.", 2 8
The Court in Zadvydas noted that the government argued that §
123 l(a)(6) serves two regulatory goals: (1) ensuring that aliens appear at
future immigration proceedings (in other words, ensuring that they are
already in custody when their deportation is secured); and (2) protecting
society from dangerous individuals. 12 9 Based upon the reasonableness
test set forth by the Court, however, one can see that the Court thought
that the former was the true regulatory goal. After all, the rule relates to
the likelihood that the alien will be deported, not to his dangerousness.
1 30
Applying the Court's analysis from Salerno, the ultimate
question is whether the indefinite detention of alien parolees is excessive
in relation to the regulatory goal of ensuring their presence when their
deportation is secured.' 3 ' The Court in Zadvydas found that the
indefinite detention of legal aliens is excessive in relation to this
regulatory goal. 32 It follows that if the Constitution applies to alien
parolees, then the Zadvydas analysis applies and indefinite detention
violates substantive due process. The issue presented here involves the
potentially permanent government detention of a person just to ensure
127 Id. at 746-47 (citations omitted).
I28 d. at 748 n.4.
129 533 U.S. at 690.
130 Id. at 699-700. See notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the rule in Zadvydas. The Court in Zadvydas noted that "the statute's basic
purpose ... [is] assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal." Id. at
699. "The second justification-protecting the community-does not
necessarily diminish in force over time. But we have upheld preventive
detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous
individuals and subject to strong procedural protections." Id. at 690-91.
"' 481 U.S. at 747.
132 3 U.S. at 690.
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that this person will be physically present if his deportation is secured.
Surely the government may accomplish the same goal by detaining the
individual until his deportation is no longer reasonably foreseeable, and
then releasing him subject to certain conditions. Indefinite detention,
however, is excessive, unnecessary, and certainly "shocks the
conscience" such that it violates substantive due process.
33
B. Procedural Due Process
Even if indefinite detention did not violate substantive due
process, it would violate procedural due process. In Salerno, the Court
noted that "[t]he Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances
under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes....
and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent
time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act. 1 34 Section 1231(a)(6) applies
to a variety of aliens, even those who have committed no crime. In
addition, the statute leaves open-ended the length of detention for alien
parolees, merely providing that they "may be detained beyond the
removal period.,
135
Moreover, an examination of the regulatory review process
shows that there are inadequate procedural safeguards surrounding the
detention. First, the burden is placed upon the alien to show that he is
not a flight risk or a danger to the community. 36 As the Court in
Zadvydas noted, in Foucha v. Louisiana the Supreme Court struck down
a Louisiana statute that placed the burden upon an insane detainee to
show that his release would present no danger to society. 137 Second, if
the DHS panel decides against release, it is required to review the alien's
status only after another year of detention. 138 Mandating review only
once a year is inadequate, especially in light of the fact that some of
these aliens are being detained for at least ten or fifteen years.
39
Detention of a human being is a grave matter, not to be taken lightly.
The presumption should be against detention. Relying upon this premise
133 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
114 481 U.S. at 747.
115 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(6). Of course, the statute on its face provides no
limitation for any of the categories of aliens, but in practice DHS must apply the
reasonable time limitation to legal aliens due to Zadvydas.
136 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1).
137 504 U.S. 71, 81-82 (1992).
138 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(k)(2)(iii), (v).
139 Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 393 n.5.
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would both place the burden upon the government to prove that detention
is necessary and demand that the detainee's case be more frequently
reviewed.
The government's indefinite detention of alien parolees is
substantively and procedurally problematic. This conclusion is no
surprise-the Court in Zadvydas found that the same government policy,
when applied to legal aliens, violates the Constitution. It follows that if
the Constitution applies to alien parolees, then their indefinite detention
must also violate the Constitution.
IV. Conclusion
Indefinite detention of alien parolees is a practice that is contrary
to the high constitutional and moral standards which our nation should
uphold. With Congress and DHS unlikely to appropriately apply due
process and end this practice, the judiciary should enforce due process
and disallow the practice of indefinite detention. Because DHS has
already decided to temporarily allow parolees to enter the country, the
courts may extend Zadvydas without stepping outside of their proper
role.
The end of our government's policy of parole, a likely
consequence of this proposal, would introduce much needed efficiency to
our immigration system. Meanwhile, all who currently reside in the
United States could enjoy the same basic constitutional protections, thus
ending the current two-tiered system of constitutional treatment. In its
decisions in Clark v. Martinez and Benitez v. Rozos, the Supreme Court
has the opportunity to take a positive step toward accomplishing these
goals.
The impact of these rulings will reach far beyond this
narrow issue, however. Underlying the above analysis is the
premise that the United States is somehow different from much of
the rest of the world. Our Constitution and our rule of law should
set an example for the world to follow because we treat people
justly and firmly, but with respect for their basic rights. The
Supreme Court has the opportunity to set such an example. It can
do so by extending Zadvydas to alien parolees, applying a
reasonable time limitation in both Clark and Benitez, and
disallowing the continued practice of indefinite detention of alien
parolees.
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